By Nile Bowie
The sectarian violence in
Myanmar’s western state of Arakan began in June 2012, and the plight of the
persecuted Rohingya ethnic group has since created an international uproar.
Displays of solidarity with the predominantly Muslim Rohingya people have been
most potent throughout the Islamic world, with a broad spectrum of support
ranging from moderate political leaders to extremist groups. While rights
advocacy groups robustly condemn Myanmar’s government for its role in the
conflict, evidence suggests that the overwhelming majority of violence was
attributed to rioting civilians from both the ethnic Rakhine Buddhist community
and the ethnic Rohingya Muslim community. The initial violence broke out on May
28th after reports circulated that a Buddhist Rakhine woman was raped and
killed by three Muslim men in the town of Ramri. Buddhist communities
throughout the state responded by circulating an incendiary pamphlet containing
details of the crime. This only served to enflame the already tense situation
in Arakan, precipitating a series of events that would draw the attention and
condemnation of much of the world.
On June 3rd, a large group of Rakhine
villagers in Toungop stopped a bus and brutally killed 10 Muslims on board. In
response to this contemptible act of brutality, several thousand Rohingya
rioted in the town of Maungdaw on June 8th, destroying Rahkine property and
killing an unknown number of predominately Buddhist villagers. These events
prompted large-scale, sectarian violence that quickly swept through the Arakan
State capital of Sittwe and surrounding localities. Mobs from both communities
stormed unsuspecting villages, killing residents and destroying homes, businesses,
and places of worship. Given the extreme poverty and sparse government security
presence in the region, residents armed themselves with machetes, sticks,
sharpened bamboo spears and other basic weapons in order to defend themselves. Vast
stretches of homes, businesses, and property from both communities were
completely destroyed, leaving thousands of residents displaced.
These events elicited an
international outcry, with much of the world showing sympathy for the Rohingya
communities who have long suffered systematic discrimination under Myanmar’s
military junta that continues today under the newly elected civilian
government. During the British colonial occupation, the lack of political
borders between Arakan and Bengal (presently referred to as Bangladesh) caused
the Muslim population to surge prior to Myanmar’s independence. It is precisely
this migration that Burmans interpret to be evidence of the community’s illegal
status. [1] Since 1982, a citizenship law passed by
the former military government has excluded the Rohingya from citizenship,
effectively rendering them stateless. Although records of Rohingya settlements
in Arakan date back to the late 7th century, successive governments have
asserted that the Rohingya are foreigners with no right to live in Myanmar, a
view shared by much of the Arakan population and much of the dominant Burman
ethnic group throughout the country.
The
communal violence in Arakan has created a refugee crisis for neighboring
Bangladesh - a nation of extreme poverty and high rates of population growth –
which is not well prepared to cope with an influx of refugees. According to the
United Nations Human Rights Agency (UNHCR), Bangladesh is currently host to
some 29,000 recognized refugees who are housed in camps and receive
international aid, as well as several thousand undocumented Rohingya living in
makeshift communities. [2] Additionally, rights advocacy group Human Rights Watch (HRW) issued a report on the violence in Arakan state titled, “The Government Could Have Stopped This,” which alleges that Myanmar’s
security forces initially stood by without intervening during the early stages
of the unrest, before joining in with Rakhine mobs to target Rohingya communities.
While it must be noted that the credibility of HRW’s reports have come under scrutiny even from founder Robert
Bernstein, who accuses the organization of using poor research methods and
politicizing their testimony, the content published by HRW examining the violence in Arakan gives a general indication of
what occurred. [3] HRW’s report acknowledges the
difficulty of verifying credible information and is based on 57 interviews with
eyewitnesses and affected individuals, all of whom remain anonymous. Contrary
to the popular perception of Rohingyas being victimized by unprovoked violence,
the report concedes that members of the Muslim community indeed used brutal tactics
of violence:
A 31-year-old Arakan mother of
five told Human Rights Watch how a large group of Rohingya entered her village
outside Sittwe around June 12 and killed her husband. She said the government
had provided no security. “They killed him right there in the village,” she
said. “His arm was cut off and his head was nearly cut off. He was 35 years
old.” A 40-year-old Arakan man in Sittwe said, “The government didn’t help us.
We had no food, no shelter, and no security [when we fled], but we protected
ourselves using sticks and knives.” [4]
The report further details how
local law enforcement, military personnel, and border patrol officers targeted
Rohingya groups in the ensuing riots; a quite plausible scenario. This is
followed in the report by hysterical accusations of systematic rape against
Rohingyas carried out by security forces, a likely exaggerated claim. In the
Libyan conflict 2011, HRW played a
vital role in publishing accusations that Muammar Gaddafi’s forces took part in
campaigns of mass rape. [5]
Advocacy groups later questioned these allegations, leading some to accuse NGOs
of knowingly publishing false claims. [6]
The dominant theme throughout the report of unrest in Myanmar is the absence of
security forces and their general inactivity. HRW also reports the prevalence of anti-Muslim sentiment being
disseminated by Myanmar’s Buddhist monks:
Some Rohingya in displacement
camps told Human Rights Watch that some Burmese soldiers had shown great compassion
and gone to the market on their behalf to purchase rice and other necessities,
but that their willingness to do so has since stopped. The soldiers’ refusal to
informally help Rohingya buy food correlates with a local campaign by Arakan
Buddhist monks—the most revered members of local Arakan society—who have
distributed pamphlets advocating for separation of the communities and
imploring the Arakan people to exclude Muslims in every way. “They are eating
our rice and staying near our houses,” the author of one pamphlet told Human
Rights Watch. “So we will separate. We need to protect the Arakan people…. We
don’t want any connection to the Muslim people at all.” [7]
Myanmar’s
President Thein Sein, whose administration instituted the most substantial
economic and social reforms in decades, shocked many by telling the United
Nations refugee agency that the Rohingya were not welcome, stating, “We will
take responsibility for our ethnic people but it is impossible to accept the
illegally entered Rohingyas, who are not our ethnicity. We will send them away
if any third country would accept them, this is what we are thinking is the
solution to the issue." [8] Democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi, whose
movement has long received diplomatic and financial support from Britain and
the United States, has disenchanted many international sympathizers by
remaining willfully silent on the issue. It is essential to understand that the
immigration policies of the Burman-dominated national political system remain
consistent within both the ruling national government and Suu Kyi’s opposition
party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), especially when dealing with
the issue of the Rohingya:
"The Rohingya are not our
citizens."
- Nyan Win,
National League for Democracy Spokesperson
“There is no ethnic group named
Rohingya in our country."
- Khin Yi,
Immigration Minister [9]
Popular
Ethno-Sectarian Nationalism & Democracy Promotion
Decades of international
isolation under the rule of a paranoid and superstitious military elite have
perpetuated the chauvinistic and xenophobic traits of the Theravada Buddhist
culture practiced in Myanmar. In attempts to prevent political fragmentation,
official mythology has long encouraged a sense of racial and moral superiority
among the majority Burman Buddhists – who comprise 60 percent of the population
– to the detriment of the nation’s many diverse ethnic and religious minority
groups. Built on the foundations of Myanmar’s contemporary culture of national pride
and militarism, the former regime perpetuated propaganda warning against
multiculturalism, alleging that the health and purity of a uniquely Burman form
of Buddhism were at risk from external contamination. Dr. Maung Zarni, an exiled dissident and research fellow at the
London School of Economics, writes:
Burmese society as a whole
remains illiberal and potently ethno-nationalist. The dominant Burmese
worldview continues to rest on an enervating combination of pre-colonial
feudalism, religious mysticism, belief in racial purity and statist militarism.
This is a potent and poisonous combination. [10]
Zarni also highlights how the politics
of Buddhist nationalism greatly restrict Suu Kyi's options as she pursues
reform, especially when dealing with the issue of Rohingya persecution. Zarni
writes, "Politically, Aung San Suu Kyi has absolutely nothing to gain from
opening her mouth on this, she is no longer a political dissident trying to
stick to her principles. She's a politician and her eyes are fixed on the
prize, which is the 2015 majority Buddhist vote." [11] Since being elected to parliament, Suu
Kyi’s focus has been in the realm encouraging foreign investment; it is
unlikely that she will use her platform to encourage racial tolerance. As she
writes in her 1985 book Burma and India, for the Burman “racial
psyche,” Buddhism "represents the perfected philosophy. It therefore
follows that there [is] no need to either to develop it further or to consider
other philosophies." [12] Despite the liberal reforms undertaken
by the civilian government, popular ethno-nationalist sentiment is pervasive,
especially among communities of Buddhist monks.
In Myanmar, the revered status
of monks prompted religious leaders to trigger a failed uprising against the
former military junta during the 2007 Saffron Revolution, a policy directive
funded and supported by the United States and British governments. A report
issued in 2006 by Burma Campaign UK
entitled “Failing the People of Burma?” offers valuable insight into
the “democracy promotion” efforts of Western governments. The report cites a
statement issued by the US Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs on October
30, 2003:
"The restoration of
democracy in Burma is a priority U.S. policy objective in Southeast Asia. To
achieve this objective, the United States has consistently supported democracy
activists and their efforts both inside and outside Burma…Addressing these
needs requires flexibility and creativity. Despite the challenges that have
arisen, United States Embassies Rangoon and Bangkok as well as Consulate
General Chiang Mai are fully engaged in pro-democracy efforts. The United
States also supports organizations, such as the National Endowment for Democracy,
the Open Society Institute and Internews, working inside and outside the region
on a broad range of democracy promotion activities. U.S.-based broadcasters
supply news and information to the Burmese people, who lack a free press. U.S.
programs also fund scholarships for Burmese who represent the future of Burma. The
United States is committed to working for a democratic Burma and will continue
to employ a variety of tools to assist democracy activists." [13]
The US State Department,
through the National Endowment for Democracy and the Open Society Institute,
have financially supported dissident media both within and outside of Myanmar,
including the New Era Journal, the Irrawaddy, the Democratic Voice of Burma, Radio
Free Asia, the Voice of America,
in addition to supporting organizations affiliated with Aung San Suu Kyi. [14] The popularity enjoyed by Suu Kyi and
her National League for Democracy party within Myanmar is largely attributable
to her affiliation with networks of Buddhist monks that have championed her
cause. In a September 2012 article titled, "Monks stage anti-Rohingya march in Myanmar," AFP reported that many of the same monks who took part in 2007’s
Saffron Revolution in support of Suu Kyi had now rallied behind President Thein
Sein and his position on expelling the Rohingya. [15]
Reports describe Wirathu, referred to in popular media as an “activist monk,” who
rallied against Rohingyas and long advocated the release of political
prisoners.
Ironically, Human Rights Watch reports that Wirathu was arrested in 2003 and
sentenced to 25 years in prison along with other monks for their role in
inciting violent clashes between Buddhists and Muslims. [16]
Though he was later granted amnesty and released, his conduct hardly describes
that of a “political prisoner.” HRW reports that organizations such as the
Young Monks Association received support from Aung San Suu Kyi's political movement
– the same organization now inciting violence, calling for the expulsion of the
Rohingya community. [17] In an
article entitled, "Burma's monks call for Muslim community to
be shunned,"
the Independent mentions the Young
Monks Association as one of the groups involved in distributing anti-Rohingya
propaganda flyers and attempting to block humanitarian aid from reaching
Rohingya camps. [18] Ashin
Htawara, another prominent exiled dissident and Buddhist monk encouraged Myanmar’s
government to send Rohingya people "back to their native land" at an
event in London hosted by the anti-Rohingya Burma Democratic Concern. [19] After fleeing Myanmar in 2007 following
the Saffron Revolution, he continued to enthusiastically support the NLD, stating,
"Aung San Suu Kyi is my special leader."
In response to his comments
toward the Rohingya community, Mark Farmaner, director of Burma Campaign UK, stated: "We were shocked to have [Ashin
Htawara] propose to us that there should be what amounts to concentration camps
for the Rohingya." [20] Additionally, prominent democracy
activists within the country such as Ko Ko Gyi, a former political prisoner, maintain
that "the Rohingya are not a Burmese ethnic group. The root cause of the
violence… comes from across the border." [21] Myanmar’s nascent media freedom has
developed in surprising ways, with social media users calling for ethnic
cleansing of the kalar, a pejorative
term used to demean people with Indian features. Foreign Policy reports of a popular backlash against foreign media
outlets such as the BBC, while the
Norway-based Democratic Voice of Burma
recently fell victim to cyber attacks for their position on the Rohingya issue.
[22]
The
Role of Saudi-linked Terror Networks in Arakan
Appalling poverty,
state-sponsored discrimination, and an absence of basic education are only some
of the attributes that make Arakan state fertile ground for ideological
extremism, especially as Rohingya feel pressured to preserve their cultural and
religious identity. In his book, “The Talibanization of Southeast Asia” author Bilveer Singh
describes how many of the predominantly Sunni Rohingya population have opted for jihad in resentment following the destruction of their holy
sites and removal of citizenship rights in 1982. Singh acknowledges that few
Muslims in Myanmar have advocated armed struggle, but notes that groups such as
the Bangladesh-based Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO), as well as
Myanmar’s most prominent political Islamic organization, the Arakan Rohingya
National Organization (ARNO), have historically maintained links with foreign
organizations such as al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban. [23]
ARNO originated from the
Arakan-based Mujahid Party, formed in 1947 with the aim of creating an
autonomous Muslim state within the then-Federal Union of Burma. The group
changed its name several times before shifting its objective to forming an
autonomous state specifically for Rohingya. ARNO, in its contemporary form, is
the result of a merger between three groups long marred by disunity and
infighting: the Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front, the Rohingya Solidarity
Organization, and the Rohingya National Alliance. The UNHCR’s official
chronology of Rohingya civilization in Myanmar cites the insurgent activity of
Islamic groups from 1991 onwards:
At a secret camp deep in the
jungle, run by the RSO [Rohingya Solidarity Organization], young Muslims are
training to make war on the Buddhist military government of Burma. The goal of
the rebels, calling themselves Mujahideen, is to restore the once independent
Muslim homeland of Arakan on Burma's west coast. It was an independent Muslim
kingdom from 1430 to 1784 and now is the only Muslim majority province in
Burma. [24]
Upon merging into ARNO, a new
Central Committee was formed with Nurul Islam as President. Singh writes of
Islam that he “has become a symbol of hope and confidence for the entire
Rohingya people.” [25] Confidential diplomatic cables from the
American Embassy in Yangon released by Wikileaks in July 2012 cite Myanmarese
intelligence documents highlighting ARNO’s connections with al-Qaeda and other
insurgent groups, and reveal that ARNO President Nurul Islam had departed to
Saudi Arabia and onward to the United States:
ARNO group had an estimated strength
of about 200 insurgents, of whom about 170 are equipped with a variety of arms.
According to Fayos Ahmed, ARNO Military-in-Charge, Salem Ulah, had contacts
with Al-Qaeda and some members of ARNO forces were arrested when they were sent
to join the Taliban in Afghanistan and attacked the Americans. These ARNO
forces were sent to Afghanistan along with Rohingya groups in Karachi,
Pakistan. Rohingya groups are in many countries like Pakistan, India, Saudi
Arabia, Malaysia, UAE, Palestine and Australia. Chairman Nurul Islam has
received an American visa and departed for Saudi Arabia from Bangladesh, with
an intent to reside in Saudi Arabia for a short period and then depart for the
United States.
[26]
If the
Myanmarese intelligence reports cited by the US Embassy in Yangon were indeed
accurate, then it would open the possibility of a foreign component fuelling
the recent unrest in Arakan. This assertion makes sense considering the global
rise of Saudi-sponsored Salafist movements aligned with US strategic
objectives.
Existing
reports describe how communal violence was carried out with basic weapons, the
role of ARNO operatives may have ranged from simply encouraging and inciting an
armed response, to using small brigades of fighters to destroy property and
commit violence, causing larger mobs to follow suit. Although the lack of
technology, media penetration, and general instability in the region at the
height of the violence make these accusations very difficult to prove, it is
entirely plausible given that Myanmar’s state media has reported the presence
of al-Qaeda in Arakan during the unrest. [27] Reports issued by the Associated Press assert that security
officials detained and charged three aid workers with “inciting religious
hatred and participating in arson attacks,” including 73-year old Kyaw Hla Aung
from Netherlands-based AZG, accused of having terrorist links and arrested
under Article 505 of Myanmar’s penal code:
“An hour or two before I was
arrested, my home was raided. I don’t know by whom. All my papers and documents
were scattered outside my house,” he said. “They said I had links to Al Qaeda.” [28]
These
reports suggest that Myanmar’s government strongly believes that foreign terror
networks have influenced the unrest in Arakan. While many would argue that
Myanmar’s government could use the pretext of Islamic extremism to maintain its
campaign of political repression, the ongoing persecution of Rohingya, as well
as sectarian clashes, open a new strategic risk that could be exploited by
foreign and domestic Islamist groups in order to further justify a violent
response that would only cause the situation to deteriorate. In Indonesia,
several hundred “hard-liners” from organizations such as the Islamic Defenders
Front (FPI) and Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT) threatened to storm the Myanmar
embassy in Jakarta at the height of the unrest, but were prevented by security
forces. [29] Ehsanullah Ehsan, a spokesman for
Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan also expressed willingness to wage jihad against
Myanmar:
“We warn [the] Pakistani
government to halt all relations with [the] Burmese government and close down
their embassy in Islamabad otherwise we will not only attack the Burmese
interests anywhere but will also attack the Pakistani fellows of Burma one by
one… We want to remind our Muslims in Burma that we haven't forgotten you, we
will take revenge of your blood.” Ehsan added: “We appeal to [the] media
especially who call themselves representative of Muslims to broadcast the real
situation in Burma and what's happening to Burmese Muslims… Taliban are with
the Burmese Muslim brethren.” [30]
The
Geopolitical Component: Thwarting Chinese Economic Development
The
situation in Myanmar is not merely to be understood on an emotional and ethical
level. Rather, it is shaped by significant geopolitical and economic realities.
Enormous natural gas deposits valued at several billion dollars have been found
in the Bay of Bengal off the coast of Arakan State, where predominantly Chinese
companies are mining in partnership with the state-owned Myanmar Oil and Gas
Enterprise. [31]
Construction has begun on oil and gas transport pipelines from Arakan State to
Yunnan Province in China. [32]
Sittwe, capital of
the Arakan State, is effectively the epicenter of one of China’s most crucial
international investments, indispensable for Beijing in its effort to meet the
increasing energy demands of its densely populated southwestern provinces.
Additionally, ongoing ethnic conflicts in Myanmar correspond directly with
large-scale Chinese development projects. Similar to other joint US-Saudi
sponsored forms of destabilization; the modus
operandi of these external networks has been to exacerbate long-standing
ethnic and religious tensions to bring about far-reaching unrest. Political
analyst Eric Draitser writes:
This project, a twin oil and
gas pipeline, which would traverse Myanmar to link China’s southwestern Yunnan
province with the Indian Ocean would, consequently, provide the Chinese
land-based access to energy imports from Africa and the Middle
East. Because of US naval dominance, not being completely reliant on
commercial shipping is an integral aspect of the overall Chinese strategy. The
pipeline itself is not the only issue for the Chinese. Sittwe is the site
of the major Chinese-funded port, which, aside from being the starting point of
the pipeline, is a vital access point to Southeast Asia and the Indian
subcontinent. Imports such as minerals and other raw materials from Africa
as well as oil from the Middle East would be shipped through this port (along
with the Pakistani port of Gwadar) for sale on the Chinese market. It is
for this reason that Sittwe is of crucial significance to Chinese economic
development. Naturally, as Sittwe and the rest of the Rakhine state descends
into chaos and the international community clamors for some form of
intervention, the port, pipeline and other projects cannot continue as planned. [33]
The development of China’s economy
has been accompanied by a dependence upon offshore resources, primarily from
reserves in Iran, Saudi Arabia and Angola. For Beijing, energy security is
essential to the continued growth of its economy, which, in turn, ensures
domestic political stability. 80 percent of China’s oil imports currently pass
through the Strait of Malacca, a narrow waterway located between Indonesia,
Malaysia, and Singapore, linking the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea and
Pacific Ocean. [34] The importance of the Myanmar-China Oil
and Gas Pipeline, consisting of two parallel oil and gas pipelines, is its
function as an alternative transport route for crude oil imports from the
Middle East to potentially bypass the Strait of Malacca, thus deterring the
ability of hostile naval powers to disrupt a vital energy corridor to China.
The United States has announced its plans to reposition 60 percent of its navy
to the Asia Pacific region by 2020, as cited in the 2012 Defense Strategic
Guidance report entitled, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership:
Priorities for 21st Century Defense.” This crucial document highlights
Washington’s growing emphasis on containing China’s military buildup in a move
to enhance American presence in one of the most economically dynamic parts of
the world. [35]
Washington’s endorsement of a
strategy designed to contain China is attributable to US foreign policy
theoreticians such as Robert Kagan of the Brookings
Institution, co-founder of the neoconservative political organization,
Project for the New American Century. Kagan’s 1997 article, “What China Knows That We Don't: The Case
for a New Strategy of Containment,” argues that the most effective means of
preserving the present international order that “serves the needs of the United
States and its allies, which constructed it,” is not to accommodate the
peaceful rise of China, but to strengthen American military capabilities in the
region and to work towards political change in Beijing:
The changes in the external and
internal behavior of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s resulted at least in
part from an American strategy that might be called "integration through
containment and pressure for change." Such a strategy needs to be applied
to China today. As long as China maintains its present form of government, it
cannot be peacefully integrated into the international order. [36]
Kagan describes how China’s
leadership interprets Washington’s interests in the Asia-Pacific as a move to “severely
limit their own ability to become the region's hegemon,” namely by countering
Chinese influence in Southeast Asia. Reports issued by the United States Army
War College’s Strategic Studies Institute reflect the adoption of Kagan’s
containment methodology. “String of Pearls: Meeting the Challenge of
China's Rising Power Across the Asian Littoral,” authored by Lieutenant
Colonel Christopher J Pehrson, highlights China’s geopolitical interests and
economic presence in several regions, which include a container shipping
facility in Chittagong, Bangladesh, the construction of a deep water port in
Sittwe, Myanmar, in addition to the construction of a navy base in Gwadar,
Pakistan, among other locations. Reports issued by the Washington Times confirm that Pehrson’s containment strategy has
been employed as policy, reissued in a paper entitled “Energy Futures in Asia,”
produced by defense contractor Booz Allen Hamilton. [37]
It appears that the sectarian
violence in Arakan State beginning in June 2012 is the likely result of covert
intelligence operations aiming to destabilize western Myanmar to counter
China’s vital economic investment in the region. This is in line with
Washington’s policy objectives of curbing Beijing’s influence in Southeast
Asia. Reforms introduced by President Thein Sein have opened the door to mass
foreign investment, the political ascension of opposition leader Aung San Suu
Kyi, and the presence of American NGOs associated with and financially
supported by US State Department, including Freedom House, Human Rights Watch, Open Society Foundations, U.S. Campaign for
Burma, and others. [38] While the United States has placed its
support behind the National League for Democracy in the person of Suu Kyi, she
has in turn exercised her influence to execute political and economic
objectives that adhere to US foreign policy.
Suu Kyi and a stable of
Western-funded NGOs have successfully used their influence to block the
construction of a joint energy project between the Myanmar Ministry of Electric
Power, Asia World Company, and the China Power Investment Corporation. The
Myitsone Dam project in the northern Myanmar state of Kachin would have been
the world’s 15th largest dam, set to be located on the Irrawaddy River in the northern
Myanmar state of Kachin. The dam is intended to export a large percentage of
its power to China's Yunnan province, which would be taxed to provide revenue
for Myanmar’s government and future development before being turned over fully
to Myanmar after a 50-year contract. [39] While groups such as Human Rights Watch use their influence to
oppose the construction the Myanmar-China Oil and Gas Pipeline and other
projects under the guise of defending human rights, a remarkable lack of
criticism is attributed toward Western oil firms operating in the country. [40]
In
2005, a group of villagers in Myanmar filed a lawsuit against Unocal, an oil
firm that merged with the American-owned Chevron, and was later obliged to
compensate the victims by court order. [41]
Western corporations at the time exploited a legal loophole that allowed them
to operate in Myanmar in defiance of US-led sanctions because their investments
were agreed upon prior to the sanctions being issued. [42]
Alongside the French-owned Total, Chevron was accused of collaborating with Myanmar’s
military junta, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), by hiring military
personnel to illegally confiscate land. Reports claim that soldiers used
tactics of torture and intimidation to force villagers into unpaid labor during
the construction of the Yadana Gas Project, a pipeline project that was
established to transport natural gas from Myanmar’s Andaman Sea into Thailand. [43]
While Beijing’s economic investment projects are sharply criticized by Aung San
Suu Kyi, she has invited the very same Western corporations into Myanmar,
despite the highly documented misconduct of these companies:
"I have to say that I find
that Total is a responsible investor in the country, even though there was a
time when we did not think they should be encouraging the military regime by
investing in Burma. They were sensitive to human rights and environmental
issues and now that we've come to a point in time when we would like investors
who are sensitive to such issues, I am certainly not going to persuade Chevron
or Total to pull out."
[44]
It would appear that the clear
preference toward Western companies held by Myanmar’s opposition is maintained
in exchange for the continued rhetorical support they receive from the United
States and Europe – despite those companies presiding over the very same human
rights abuses that Chinese firms are accused of. The political undercurrents of
Western support are laid bare as American corporations begin to fully engage in
investment opportunities throughout the country. Political analyst F. William
Engdahl writes:
The US corporations approaching
Burma are handpicked by Washington to introduce the most destructive “free
market” reforms that will open Myanmar to instability. The United States will
not allow investment in entities owned by Myanmar’s armed forces or its
Ministry of Defense. It also is able to place sanctions on “those who undermine
the reform process, engage in human rights abuses, contribute to ethnic
conflict or participate in military trade with North Korea.” The United States
will block businesses or individuals from making transactions with any
“specially designated nationals” or businesses that they control — allowing
Washington, for example, to stop money from flowing to groups “disrupting the
reform process.” It’s the classic “carrot and stick” approach, dangling the
carrot of untold riches if Burma opens its economy to US corporations and
punishing those who try to resist the takeover of the country’s prize assets.
Oil and gas, vital to China, will be a special target of US intervention. [45]
Conclusion
Myanmar faces innumerable
challenges in its pursuit of development. They range from combating forms of racism
and violence that target Myanmar’s ethnic minorities to the lack of basic infrastructure
and civic educational initiatives to maintaining national sovereignty while
introducing liberalizing economic reforms. Although Myanmar’s civilian
government led by Thein Sein has issued meaningful reforms, many exiles and
activists perceive this administration to be a new face on an old and
belligerent regime – despite being praised domestically for its position on
expelling Rohingyas. As the country approaches its highly anticipated national
elections in 2015, a victory for either side will likely not sit well with the
other. Given the Western support allotted to Aung San Suu Kyi and her political
party, it can be expected that the ruling government – should it win the 2015
elections – would be categorically condemned. Myanmar’s diverse mosaic of
politically oppressed ethnic groups put the national government in a sensitive
position; continued Western support for their autonomy or independence could
give rise to the formation of break-away states, too small to assert their
sovereignty at the foot of multinational corporations.
It remains very unlikely that
Myanmar will repeal the 1982 Citizenship Law that removed basic rights from the
Rohingya and other minorities. However, President Thein Sein has pledged to
open schools for Rohingya, insinuating that they would be allowed to remain in
the country. [46] Myanmar’s government would benefit by
appeasing advocacy groups and lifting restrictions on humanitarian agencies to
ensure they can freely move to remote villages in order to deliver necessary
medical assistance, with governmental oversight. Additionally, such agencies
could investigate credible allegations of human rights violations and provide
legal counsel to those detained in northern Arakan State. Greater focus should
be placed on reconciliation talks between ethnic minority groups, although very
little likelihood exists that such suggestions would be meaningfully applied
given the tense climate of racial prejudice in Myanmar. In his 1934 novel, Burmese Days, author George Orwell
writes:
“To talk, simply to talk! It
sounds so little, and how much it is! When you have existed to the brink of
middle age in bitter loneliness, among people to whom your true opinion on
every subject on earth is blasphemy, the need to talk is the greatest of all
needs.”
Notes
[14] Ibid
[17] Ibid
[21] Ibid
Nile Bowie is a Kuala Lumpur-based
American writer and photographer for the Centre for Research on Globalization
in Montreal, Canada. He explores issues of terrorism, economics and
geopolitics.
